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Abstract 
 
From libertarian and critical-rationalist assumptions, the moral permissibility of 
abortion and infanticide can be explained and defended in three principal ways; 
although non-libertarians and justificationists could also accept these arguments. 
These include theories of personhood and harm-infliction. The three defences are 
independent of each other but collectively consistent. 1) The unborn and infant human 
is not a person in the relevant intellectual and moral sense. 2) There is no overall 
proactive imposition (harm-infliction), as the unborn or infant human is only denied 
the benefit of support. 3) The better welfare consequences. Two related private-
property and contract issues are briefly addressed. It is concluded that the three 
complementary arguments may be hard to refute, and that accepting abortion but 
rejecting infanticide is inconsistent. 
 
0. Introduction 
 
In my first year at university the “Introduction to Moral Philosophy” course included various 
texts on world poverty, killing versus letting die, abortion, and infanticide. My responses to 
all of these issues led me to develop one type of libertarian position on morals (briefly, that 
moral neutrality must always be logically possible); although I did not fully appreciate the 
libertarian connection at the time. At the end of that year I submitted an essay to a scholarly 
journal applying the argument to abortion and infanticide. It was not accepted and it didn’t 
occur to me to submit it elsewhere. It seems to me that this argument is still highly relevant, 
and so I finally apply it again here (section 2), but along with two other arguments also first 
developed then.1 
 
The moral permissibility of abortion and infanticide can be explained and defended in three 
principal ways: 1) the unborn and infant human is not a person, 2) the unborn and infant 
human is not proactively imposed on (no overall harm is inflicted), and 3) the better welfare 
consequences. Although all three ways can be characterised as libertarian and critical 
rationalist,2 they stand or fall to the same degree were any explicit references to 
libertarianism or critical rationalism to be removed. There will also be some brief discussion 
of two related property and contract issues. 
 
1. The unborn and infant human is not a person 
 
An unborn Homo sapiens is human, although perhaps not yet a particular human if before the 
stage at which twins, etc., can occur and not be reversed. It is human at whatever stage of 
development: zygote, morula, blastocyst, embryo, foetus, and preterm baby. But is it a person 
in the intellectual-development sense? For there appears to be a real distinction between a 
 
1 A separate essay now also applies the same argument, plus others, to Singer 1972. 
2 For an introductory discussion on critical rationalism plus a list of further reading see 
Wetterson undated. See also Lester 2012b and 2017. 
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person and a non-person that can be discovered. Adapting the epistemology of critical 
rationalism can allow a theory of what constitutes personhood. Thus a person is here 
tentatively theorised to be a consciousness capable of abstract conjectures (beyond immediate 
appearances) and critical theorising (having theories about theories beyond merely noticing 
their functionality); and it seems that possession of a language may well be a practical 
necessity to achieve this. This theory is not in itself a definition or a criterion of personhood, 
although it can also be used as either of these as well. Therefore, an unborn human is not a 
person because it has at most, and mainly in the later stages, appetites and instincts. This 
essay will not go into a detailed explanation and defence of this theory of personhood. It 
suffices that this theory, or something relevantly like it, appears to capture a real and 
important intellectual aspect of sufficiently developed humans.  
 
Being a person is necessary to give human beings their higher moral value: more or less 
because they have sophisticated minds, or consciousnesses, that are created by abstract 
conjectures and critical theorising. Biologically, humans are animals. Animals that are not 
persons (let us here call them ‘beasts’: this is a stipulative definition) have moral value too, 
and it is certainly possible to have moral duties towards them (although this is outside 
libertarian theory); in particular, that of not causing them indefensible pain or suffering.3 And 
some beasts—chimpanzees, elephants, and dolphins, for instance—approach being persons; 
so moral duties towards them may exceed that of unambiguous beasts.4 But being a person is 
what makes immoral all proactively-imposed costs (this being a libertarian theory of 
‘inflicted harms’) that flout self-ownership and libertarian property (these being the practical 
applications of the abstract theory of interpersonal liberty as ‘people not proactively imposing 
costs on each other’5). 
 
The unborn human is usually a potential person. But then so are any sperm and ovum that 
could in principle be conjoined; or even any food, or other substances, that could eventually 
be converted into a person. Therefore, it would be absurd to hold that a potential person 
already has the moral status of an actual person, or even of anything approaching that. It 
would be equally absurd to reverse this and hold that a potential non-person (as anyone might 
be considered to be; by death or sufficient brain damage, for instance) already has the moral 
status of an actual non-person, or even of anything approaching that. If it is not inherently 
immoral to kill a non-person, as beasts are, then it is not inherently immoral to kill an unborn 
human.6 
 
It follows that neither is it inherently immoral to kill an infant not yet a person (although 
there might be bad social side-effects of one kind or another; such as greatly upsetting some 
people who also might resort to violence). It is probably best to draw a line for permissible 
infanticide, erring on the side of non-personhood, maybe at some time in the first year or so 
after birth and always well before sufficiently sophisticated speech—or other 
 
3 To say there is a moral duty not to inflict indefensible pain or suffering on a beast, is not to 
imply that a beast can have rights or duties: comprehension and reciprocity seem required for 
those to exist. One also has a moral duty not to destroy some historic buildings or great works 
of art, but they do not have rights or duties either. 
4 At the other end of the scale there are simple beasts that approach, or even reach, the usually 
far lower moral value of plants. 
5 See Lester 2012, 2014, 2016. 
6 Some vegetarianism and veganism for the sake of the beasts might conflict with this 
argument. But this is not the right place to criticise those ideologies. 
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communication—indicates that personhood has been achieved (the word ‘infant’ has its 
origins in the Latin ‘infans’, meaning ‘without speech’). The agreement of any parents or 
guardians may be necessary: they usually have a property claim in the human non-person. 
 
It might immediately be suggested, as an attempted reductio ad absurdum, that by this 
standard an unconscious or comatose adult human is not a person but only a potential person, 
and so morally on a par with an unborn or infant human as regards the permissibility of 
killing him.7 However, as long as consciousness can be recovered, it looks far more cogent to 
see this as an existing person: personhood is not merely potential but has already been 
achieved. It is simply that this person’s consciousness is temporarily interrupted, and so full 
rights relating to personhood remain. 
 
This, then, appears to be one sufficient explanation of the way in which abortions and 
infanticides of humans are not intrinsically immoral. It is libertarian in the sense that this 
ideology holds that only persons have a right not to have their liberty infringed; of which 
being killed is clearly an extreme example. Other accounts of personhood have been used to 
argue in approximately the same way on abortion, such as Warren 1973 (but that article does 
not fully and consistently draw out and accept its relevant logical implications with respect to 
infanticide). However, they will not be compared and contrasted here. 
 
2. The unborn and infant human is not proactively imposed on 
 
On the assumption that the unborn human is a person, pregnancy is like becoming physically 
attached to an unconscious adult person—whether intentionally, by chance, or by 
carelessness—where no one else could or would have supported that particular adult and he 
requires your bodily support for nine months. If you decide that you do not wish to continue 
the support, then there is no overall proactive imposition—inflicted harm—on the 
unconscious adult by stopping. And there is no inherent moral difference, in these terms, 
between a simple ‘unplugging’ and an active killing of the unconscious adult; if that is 
necessary, or even merely more convenient, for you to exercise your right8 to use your own 
body as you wish. There seem to be two necessary and sufficient aspects for moral 
permissibility here: (1) you have exercised your right to use your own body as you wish; and 
(2) the unconscious adult is not worse off than if you had never started to support him in the 
first place (“no one else could or would have supported that particular adult”). One too-hasty 
criticism might be that such an argument could seem to imply that killing one’s adult 
offspring is permissible, as they are thereby not worse off than they would have been had you 
never benefitted them—by conception, etc.—in the first place. But that would be to overlook 
(1): killing your adult offspring is not exercising your right to use your own body, or any of 
your other property (or liberty-entailed possessions), as you wish. This is close to the position 
taken in Thomson 1971 (but that article does not fully and consistently draw out and accept 
its relevant logical implications with respect to infanticide). However, by removing the 
contingent complications surrounding both abortion and being attached to another person it is 
possible to make a more fundamental argument that should be clearer and more cogent. 
 
Here is that argument. To bestow a benefit on others, for their own sakes, is prima facie 
morally good. To proactively impose—inflict harms—on others, for whatever reason, is 
 
7 Gene Callahan produced this criticism (personal communication). 
8 One can, and typically will, mention rights here; but normative matters do not need to be 
mentioned if one is discussing only what abstract interpersonal liberty implies in practice. 
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prima facie morally bad. To do neither is prima facie morally neutral. It cannot proactively 
impose on other people to deny them, or to stop, a bestowal of a benefit (to contract to help 
someone in some way and then fail to observe one’s contractual obligations is a proactive 
imposition and not the denial of a bestowable benefit9). Libertarianism, in particular, appears 
to require and make these three moral distinctions. But, in any case, logical analysis also 
appears to imply them. For if we want to classify mere failure to benefit people as immoral, 
then—conversely—we seem bound to classify mere failure to proactively impose on people 
as positively moral. However, proactive impositions are usually far easier to bring about than 
equivalent bestowable benefits (e.g., destroying someone’s house by arson versus providing 
someone with a free house). Consequently, we omit to proactively impose on people to a far 
greater extent than we omit to bestow benefits on them. This implies a paradox: merely by 
doing nothing, we are usually both moral and immoral at the same time or—on balance—
positively extremely moral. There is no conceptual room for moral neutrality (unless, 
perhaps, when we are contingently not in a position to do either or they are by sheer chance 
in perfect balance). To avoid this paradox, it seems only coherent to distinguish good, bad, 
and neutral (or innocent) moral behaviour. 
 
From this more fundamental argument we can see that the unborn and infant human is only 
benefitted by conception and support (or, at least, there is no inherent proactive imposition in 
that process). Therefore, removal of that continuing bestowed benefit cannot in itself be a 
proactive imposition—or inflicted harm—even if we assume personhood. If they do not 
inflict pain or suffering (or conflict with any other libertarian property rights; see section 
four), abortion and infanticide are morally neutral.10 There is, of course, no libertarian 
obligation to give the infant to other people. And other people would be proactively imposing 
if they trespassed in order to “rescue”—i.e., engage in the theft of—the infant. 
 
3. The better consequences 
 
Even if we assume that the unborn or infant human both is a person and is proactively 
imposed on, proactively coercing women to carry to term their unwanted unborn humans, or 
to support their infants, or to give them to others to support, cannot plausibly increase overall 
human welfare compared to allowing the women to bear and raise children, or put them up 
for adoption, when they wish to do so.11 First, there is the significant welfare-reduction to 
women, or parents, that are either prevented from opting for abortion or infanticide or obliged 
to resort to criminalised and, consequently, possibly dangerous means (with punishment if 
they are caught and convicted). Then there is the fact that preventing abortions or infanticides 
of unwanted humans must thereby be to reduce the numbers of wanted unborn and infant 
 
9 It might be suggested that, at least if it is a person, there is some sort of contract between the 
mother and the unborn human to bring him to term, etc. But there is no kind of—even 
implied—offer, or acceptance of that offer, or any quid pro quo; which contracts require. A 
pregnant woman usually did tacitly consent to, at least risk, creating the unborn human. 
However, that is not thereby tacitly to consent to continue support of it. 
10 Active infanticide might even be morally required if the alternative is a passive death that 
involves pain or suffering. 
11 This comparison can be by thought-experiment or by comparing actual different countries 
or regions with different rules. 
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humans that would have otherwise had use of, more or less, the same resources; and wanted 
offspring are, on average, more likely to have better lives than unwanted offspring.12 
 
This position is libertarian only in the sense that some libertarians think that abortion and 
infanticide are both compatible with liberty and also with the best welfare outcomes: either 
because they are consequentialist libertarians13 or because they are critical-rationalist 
libertarians who defend the libertarian conjecture from all criticisms, including 
consequentialist ones. 
 
4. Two related private-property and contract issues 
 
All that said, if people strongly object to abortion or infanticide, for whatever reasons, then 
they can still choose to live in unified private-property areas or join private organisations 
where these things are contractually proscribed on pain of whatever penalties they wish. To 
go into, or remain in, those areas or join these private organisations would be to contract to 
accept those proscriptions and those penalties. But even then, the breaking of the contract 
would still not conflict with any rights or liberties of the unborn or infant human. It would 
conflict only with the rights or liberties of the parties with whom one has contracted.  
 
Current state-legislation concerning child-support does not approximate to what is libertarian. 
Where a man passes his sperm during sexual intercourse with a woman, he cannot merely 
thereby have any libertarian rights concerning the resultant unborn or infant human. In the 
same way, a woman who freely chooses to risk unprotected or imperfectly protected sex with 
a man does not merely thereby have any rightful claims against the man if she becomes 
pregnant or gives birth. To gain any such rights on either side a contract is required, such as a 
marriage contract. Once again, though, private-property rules can override this default 
position. Some people might want to live in unified private-property areas where there is an 
implied contract for men and women to have duties and rights with respect to their unborn or 
infant humans. But without allowing people to choose such real property solutions it seems 
unlikely that the state can usefully approximate to what they would have been. Therefore, the 
intrinsic position of no rights or duties on either side without a contract should prevail. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
On its own, each of the three principal arguments may be sufficient to explain the moral 
permissibility of the abortion and infanticide of unwanted humans—depending on the types 
of objections being addressed. Taking them together, they amount to a consistent and fairly 
comprehensive account that it is hard to see could easily be refuted. It is common, however, 
for people to accept some versions of these arguments as applied to abortion but reject them 
as regards infanticide. And that is simply to be inconsistent. 
 
 
 
12 Utilitarian paradoxes or problems concerning total-versus-average utility are ignored here. 
However, it is worth mentioning that even if proactively imposing the prevention of abortions 
and infanticides really does increase total utility because more humans consequently live, 
then the same number of humans—or more—could probably be produced with even more 
utility by paying or otherwise rewarding women to voluntarily have more offspring. 
13 Notable consequentialist libertarians (or at least classical liberals, if a distinction is made) 
include Milton Friedman, David D. Friedman, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich Hayek. 
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